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4QUARANTINE SCHEMES FOR MANNED LUNAR MISSIONS
Introduction
Presented herein are the fundamental quarantine and sample release
plans for manned lunar missions as established by the Interagency
Committee on Back Contamination. Obviously, the scheme does not contain
all possible finite technical details about quarantine test methods and
containment provipions, but it provides the necessary framework for
action by the Interagency Committee on Back Contamination and substantive
methods for satisfying the quarantine requirements of the Regulatory
Agencies.*
It is, of course, impossible in any set of quarantine plans to
anticipate every eventuality. Therefore, it is necessary that the
schemes include a contingency provision that gives the Interagency
Committee and the Regulatory Agencies adequate opportunity to provide 	 -
requirements and suggestions for situations not covered in the formal
plans. It is likewise necessary to emphasize that in spite of efforts
being made to assure aseptic collection and return of lunar samples,
there is no certainty of the complete absence of earth microbial
contaminants. And certainly, the potential of earth contaminants in
returned lunar samples will be significantly greater after the first
Apollo mission.
Astronaut Release Scheme
Table I provides the general scheme for the quarantine and release
of the astronauts and medical support personnel in the Crew Reception
Area (CRA) of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL). The scheme covers
three possible results and indicates the course of action for each.
Implicit in each is an appropriate review by the Interagency Committee
and the accomplishment of any formal action and recommendation that
might be required.
Proposition I is the most likely with release of the astronauts
and medical support personnel from the CRA after approximately 21 days.
This action will accrue if there are no alterations in the general
health of the quarantined people and no other indications of infectious
disease due to lunar exposure.
*In this document the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
the U. S. Department of Agriculture, and the U. S. Department of the
Interior are referred to as the Regulatory Agencies.
Should a definite alteration in the health of one or more persons
in the CRA occur (Proposition II), release of the people would probably
not be delayed if the alteration is diagnosed as non infectious or is of
terrestrial origin. If the source of the alteration cannot be readily
diagnosed, however, some prolongation of the quarantine may be necessary.
In either case, under Proposition II, review of the data and recommenda-
tions by the Interagency Committee are required.
Proposition III establishes the requirement that laboratory
personnel from the sample laboratory of the LRL be housed in the CRA
following a severe rupture of a cabinet system containing lunar material
suspected of containing harmful or infectious materials. While precise
specification of events for Proposition III are not outlined in Table I,
the NASA medical team should consider all available information and make
recommendations concerning release of the laboratory people. These
recommendations should be reviewed and approved by the Interagency
Committee. If it is decided that the laboratory personnel must undergo
quarantine, the medical observations would identify Propositions I or
II in Table I. It must be recognized that this situation could result
in prolonged quarantine of the astronauts.
Phase I Sample Release Scheme
The scheme outlined in Table II provides a general plan fjr each of
three sets of circumstances resulting from quarantine testing of lunar
samples. Examination and review of the quarantine data by the Inter-
agency Committee before release or non release of the sample is provided
in each case. In other words, in each case the Interagency Committee
would have identified an appropriate time for coordinating their
position and making their recommendations to the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
Proposition I of Table II shows the course of action for what
should be the most probable result of sample quarantine testing, the
situation in which the protocol is carried out in the LRL with
completely negative results: no viable organisms being isolated and no
pathogenic effects being noted in the animals and plant systems tested.
For this eventuality, Proposition I calls for the Interagency Committee
to meet, examine, and review the quarantine data, and if satisfied as
to its validity and reliability, recommend to NASA the reAse of samples
from that returned mission. Formal clearance by the Regulatory Agencies
is effected as a part of this plan.
Proposition II of Table II prescribes the course of action to be
followed in the event that a replicating organism is detected in the
lunar sample without any deleterious effects being noted on the life
systems or terrestrial niches tested in the LRL. Should this result
materialize, the aim of the flow chart under Proposition II is to
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determine: (1) if the organism isolated is of terrestrial origin,
unmodified by any lunar exposure and generally considered as "non
pathogenic", or (2) if the organism is not readily classified as being
of terrestrial origin and therefore of potential hazard to terrestrial
ecology.
In regard to statement (1) above, demonstration that the organism in
question is identical with organisms collected from the spacecraft, from
spacecraft equipment, or from the astronauts during preflight sampling,
or classification of the organism as a harmless terrestrial microbe
would be adhuate reason for neither extending nor expanding the quarantine.
The inability to recover a common, identifiable,and non pathogenic
organism a second time from a duplicate lunar sample would further in-
dicate that an earth contaminant rather than an organism indigenous to
the lunar sample was involved. In this same regard, lunar sample
contamination could result following a break in the primary barrier of
the LRL. If the organism isolated cannot be readily classified or other-
wise shown to be of terrestrial origin, there then would be the need for
initiation of a contingency quarantine plan.
Under Proposition II, Table II, the scheme requires review by the
Interagency Committee at the points indicated. Adequate demonstration
that the organisms are terrestrial, unchanged, and usually reg,-xded as
"non pathogenic" would be considered by the Interagency Committee as
sufficient reason for not requiring challenge of additional terrestrial
niches before sample release. Failure of the protocol tests to provide
this information about organisms isolated from the lunar sample, however,
would signal the need for further quarantine testing (indicated as
Phase II quarantine) and/or release of sample according to conditions*
then specified by the Regulatory Agencies, and/or release of samples
after sterilization.
Proposition III of Table II covers the situation where definite
deleterious effects are noted on one or more of th,1 life systems tested
in the LRL. Should this occur, the effects observed may be due to
chemical toxicity rather than to invasion by a replicating organism.
This would be indicated if sterilized lunar material (the control)
produced the same deleterious effects and if no replicating organisms
were found. It is always possible, however, that replicating contami-
nants will be uncovered along with a toxic chemical. In such cases,
*Release to certain specified laboratories for further study; or steri-
liza •c-ion before release, but only after consultation with invertigators
to determine if this is satisfactory to theirs cific experiment; or
release to the LRL so that i►lsiting scientisto principal Investigators)
can work in the LRL under containment conditions to carry out early
experiments.
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it will be necessary to identify the organisms as of terrestrial origin
and to classify then as "harmless" in order to avoid testing additional
terrestrial niches or life systems.
Finally, if replicating organisms are indicated as the cause of
definite deleterious effects on tested life systems, Phase II quarantine
will be indicated with the possibility of a subsequent conditional
release and/or only sterilized samples will be released. Under
Proposition III appropriate places for review and action by the Inter-
agency Ccomittee are indicated.
Phase II Sample Release Scheme
The probability is very remote of a contingency quarantine of a
lunar sample due to the presence of unidentified replicating organisms
or because of non-explained deleterious effects on life systems that are
not due to chemical toxicity. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the
prevention of possible terrestrial back contamination be specific with
regard to these remote probabilities in order that the intent of the
Interagency Committee on Back Contamination Terms of Reference* be ful-
filled and that the legal requirements of the Regulatory Agencies be
satisfied. The Phase II quarantine scheme for these eventualities is
specified is Table III.
Phase II requires a prolongation of the quarantine for an un-
specified time interval. However, even at the outset of Phase II, the
Interagency Committee could recommend release of some portions of the
lunar samples to non-biological institutions under specific conditions
of handling. The conditions would, for the most part, relate to the use
of the sample inside biological barriers.
Otherwise, Phase II quarantine involves continued testing of animal
and plant species in the LRL. As indicated in Table III, the scheme
could also provide for conditional release of cultures isolated in the
LRL or specimens to certain biological laboratory institutions in the
United States for more detailed study of possible pathogenic effects.
These laboratories, however, must meet existing specifications of the
Regulatory Agencies for handling potentially virulent pathogens.
*Interagency Agreement between the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health..
Education and Welfare, the Department of the Interior, and the National
Academy of Sciences on the protection of the Earth's biosphere from
lunar sources of contamination: Attachment A: Interagency Committee
on Back Contamination Terms of Reference.
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(Phase II quarantine could take advantage of visiting scientists in the
LRL as bioscience specialists to carry out specific tests for patho-
genicity, should such talents be available.)
Contingency Landings
The release schemes outlined above assume that a nominal or near
nominal landing of the crew, spacecraft, and related equipment has been
achieved. In the event of a contingency landing -- off nominal -- the
details and method of quarantine must be adapted to the exigencies of the
situation. Immediate authoritative decisions must be made as they
apply to quarantine and back contamination as well as other time
critical problems.
For such cases, the quarantine aspects will be represented by a
F	
Quarantine Control Officer.* To the extent possible during a disaster,
he will obtain direction from the Regulatory members of the Interagency
Committee before initiating disaster control procedures. Prior to the
first returned lunar mission it will be the responsibility of the
Quarantine Control Officer to prepare and have approved by the NASA
medical team and the Science and Applications Director (Manned Spacecraft
Center), and the Regulatory Agencies a document outlining typical courses
of action for several types of contingency landings.
Release of Film and Data Tapes
The film and data tapes will be returned to the LRL in the same
manner as the lunar samples, admitted to quarantine, and maintained
behind a biological barrier. The data tapes will then be played through
the biological barrier for outside processing.
The film will be processed inside the quarantine facility and
printed through the biological barrier with an optical printer for
outside use.
If current studies indicate that ethylene-oxide sterilization of the
film is possible when the film is contaminated with bacterial spores and
that no degradation of the film occurs, there is the possibility that
immediate release of sterilized film will be allowed without printing
through the barrier. The statistical reliability of the ethylene-oxide
process should be such that the treatment will fail to give sterility no
more than 1 in 10,000 times (81x10-4).
*Manned Spacecraft Center Management Instruction 8030.1, dated
January 9, 1967: Assignment of Responsibility for the Prevention of
Contamination of the Biosphere by Extraterrestrial Life.
^-	 ^.^	
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Spacecraft Release
The spacecraft will enter the LRL in a sealed configuration and be
placed in isolation near the CRA (this area can become a part of the
quarantine facility if necessary). It will follow the same time con-
straints as the sample -- 30 days -- prior to release if all results are
negative. It will, however, be available for additional bio-sampling if
deemed necessary by the Quarantine Control Officer. At his discretion,
it may also be entered for technical inspection provided that it is
placed inside the biological barrier and the personnel and spacecraft
become an integral part of the quarantine facility and scheme of release
at that time.
Summary
The Interagency Committee has prepared this document in order that
all agencies and persons involved in returned lunar samples may have a
clear understanding of the procedures the Interagency Committee feels
are necessary for the realistic program to protect this planet from
possible back contamination. Moreover,the Interagency Committee
presents this document as one that will satisfy the requirements of the
Regulatory Agencies of Government without undue hardship on NASA.
Although the Interagency Committee feels that very few alternates to
this plan are possible, it wishes to acknowledge a speedy and uncondi-
tional release of the sample; a minimum of expense and delay is highly
Ott	 advantageous to the scientific community.
The schemes proposed may be summarized as follows:
1. Astronauts and Medical Support Personnel
a. Release after 21 days if no alterations in general health
are observed and in the absence of an infectious disease attributable
to lunar exposure.
b. If significant alterations in general health occur, release
is still indicated if alterations are diagnosed as of terrestrial origin
or as non communicable.
c. If alterations are apparent and not diagnosed, some delay
in release would be indicated with the final action to be recommended
by the NASA medical team.
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2. Conditions for Lunar Sample Release
a. It is expected that prompt release of lunar samples after
completion of the protocol tests can be recommended by the Interagency
Committee to the Administrator of NASA or NASA's designated representative.
The nominal results expected Would obviously not impose any unusual
conditions upon the release.
b. Interagency Committee conditional release could result if
there is sufficient doubt regarding the presence of pathogenic organisms
in the lunar samples. In this instance, release of sterilized samples
would be possible, or some samples might be released providing they are
used only behind a suitable biological barrier. In the case of a
conditional release, Phase II quarantine testing will proceed as rapidly
as possible in an attempt to clarify the data regarding possible
pathogenic effects.
3. Validity Constraints for Sample Release
It is in the interest of all cowaerned that the quarantine
testing procedures be designed to avoid events that would produce invrlid
results. To insure that "lunar pathogens" will not be falsely detected,
the sample release scheme contains the following constraints.
a. If replicating organisms are found in the sample and no
deleterious effects are noted in any of the terrestrial niches tested in
the LRL, release will not be delayed beyond the time needed to identify
the organisms as terrestrial contaminants.
b. If deleterious effects from lunar material are noted with
the terrestrial life sys..ems tested in the LRL, release will not be
delayed beyond the time needed to show that the effects were due to
chemical toxicity and that any replicating organisms isolated from the
sample were of terrestrial origin, harmLless, and not responsible for
the effects.
c. Should Phase I quarantine procedures indicate the presence
of a substance pathogenic to terrestrial life, Phase II procedures will
be initiated to verify or more adequately explain the Phase I results.
a'
7
INTERAGENCY COWITTEE ON BACK CONTAMINATION
Membership
Prillary	 Alternate
David J. Soccer, M. D. (Chairman)
National Communicable Disease Center
U. S. Public Health Service
Dr. John Ba&y, Jr. (Co-Chairman)
National Ccvuunicable Disease Center
U. S. Public Health Service
Dr. Wolf Vishniac
University of Rochester
(National Academy of Sciences
representative)
Dr. Ernest Saulmon
Department of Agriculture
Mr. Hovard H. Eckles
Department of the Interior
Dr. Harold P. Klein:
Ames Research Center, NASA
Charles A. Berry, M. D.
b:,;nced Spacecraft Center, NASA
Dr. Wilmot N. Hess
Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA
Mr. lavrence B. Hall
Office of Space Science and
Applications, NASA
Dr. James Turnock
Office of Manned Space Flight, NASA
Colonel John E. Pickering
(Execut , Secretary)
Office oZ Manned Space Flight, NASA
Dr. G. Briggs Phillips
U. S. Public Bealth Service Consultant
Dr. Allan Brown
University of Pennsylvania
Dr. A. B. Park
Department of Agriculture
Dr. John Buckley
Department of 'che Interior
Dr. Adrian Mandel
Ames Research Ce: *,er, NASA
Walter W. Kemmerer, M. D.
Manned opae.ecraft Center, NASA
Mr. Joseph V. Piland
Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA
Captain Arthur H. Neill
Office of Space Science and
Applications, NASA
8
TABLE I. ASTRONAUT QUARANTINE SCHEME FOR MANNED LUNAR MISSIONS
} j AlllONAUll RECOVEREC , ^:-~ RETURNED TO
THE LR-
AT THE LRL ASTRONAUTS AND
MEDICAL SUPPORT PERSONNEL
INTERNED IN THE CRA FOR
APPROXIMATELY 21 DAYS.
PROPOSI TI ON I	 PROPOSITION II 	 TI ON III
r -
NO ALTERATIONS IN
GENERAL HEALTH. NO
INDICATION OF
INFECTIOUS DISEASE
DUE TO LUNAR EXPOSURE.
RUPTURE OF PRIMARY
BARRIER IN LRL RESULTS
IN USE OF THE CRA FOR
PERSONNEL HOUSING,
ALTERATIONS IN	 ACTION TO BE
GENERAL HEALTH	 RECOMMENDED
NOTED.	 B`: I` ASA MEDICAL
TEAM.
ALTERATION DIAGNOSED LAJ 	 SOURCE OF
AS NON INFECTIOUS OR	 ALTERATION
AS OF TERRESTRIAL CRIGIN.
	
	 NOT READILY
DIAGNOSED.
ACTION TO BE
RECOMMENDED BY
NASA MEDICAL
TEAM.
RELEASE	 RELEASEI
	
I RELEASE
INDICATES:
(A) REVIEW OF DATA 4D PROPOSED ACTION BY THE INTERAGENCY
COMMITTEE ON BACK CONTAMINA.TION, AND
(B)FORMAL CLEARANCE BY THE REGULATORY AGENCIES, WHEN
NECESSARY.
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eTABLE II. QUARANTINE SCHEME FOR RETURNED LUNAR SAMPLES iPHASE -Ij
SAMPLES RECOVERED AND RETURNED
TO THE LRL UNDER CONTAINMENT
CONDITIONS.
SAMPLES SUBMITTED TO QUARANTINE
TESTS AS APPROVED BY INTERAGENCY
COMMITTEE ON BACK CONTAMINATION.
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PROPOSITION III
P,
NO REPLICATING OR
VIABLE ORGANISMS
FOUND. NO
DELETERIOUS EFFECTS
ON TESTED LIFE
SYSTEMS.
CONDITIONAL UNCONDITIONAL
RELEASE	 RELEASE
ORGANISMS OF
TERRESTRIAL
ORIGIN.
I RCONADIEIONALI IUN OEDITIONALI
REPLICATING ORGANISMS 	 CONTINUED DELETERIOUS
FOUND. BUT NO	 EFFECTS NOTED ON A
DELETERIOUS EFFECTS 	 i ESTED LIFE SYSTEM.
NOTED ON LIFE SYSTEMS.
REPLICATINGI REPLICATING
ORGANISMS ORGANISMS
FOUND. NOT FOUND.
ORCANISMS ORGANISMS CLASSIFIED]
CLASSIFIED AS AS TERRESTRIAL AND
"PATHOGENIC". "NON PATHOGENIC".
I
CONDITIONAL I UNCONDITIONAL
RELEASE RELEASE
ORGANISMS OF
UNKNOWN
ORIGIN.
SAMPLE
STERILIZATION
UNCONDITIONAL
RELEASE
PHASE II QUARANTINE
OR
REGULATORY AGENCY
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
VISITING SCIENTISTS
INDICAT=S:
(A) REVIEW OF Dt-TA AND PROPOSED ACTION BY THE INTERAGENCY
COMMITTEE ON SACK CONTAMINATION, 4ND
(B) FORMAL CLEARANCE BY THE REGULATORY AGENCIES, WHEN
NECESSARY.
PHASE II QUARANTINE
OR
REGULATORY AGENCY
CONDITIONAL RELEASE
VISITING SCIENTISTS
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TABLE III. QUARANTINE SCHEME FOR RETURNED LUNAR SAMPLES (PHASE 11)
PHASE I RESULTS IN REPLICATING
ORGANISMS NOT IDENTIFIABLE AS
TERRESTRIAL BUT NO DELETERIOUS
EFFECTS NOTED ON LIFE SYSTEMS
TESTED IN THE LRL.
OR
PHASE I SHOWS A DEFINITE
DELETERIOUS EFFECT, NOT DUE TO
CHEMICAL TOXICITY, ON A LIFE
SYSTEM TESTED IN THE LRL. NO
REPLICATING ORGANISMS FOUND.
PROLONGATION OF QUARANTINE
PERIOD
EXPANDED BIOLOGICAL TESTING
VISITING BIOSCIENCE I	 STUDY OF CULTURES OR SAMPLES
SPECIALISTS AT THE 	 &/OR	 AT SELECTED, APPROVED BIOLOGICAL
LRL.	 I LABORATORY INSTITUTIONS.
REVIEW OF DATA BY INTERAGENCY
COMMITTEE WITH RECOMMENDATIONS
AS TO CONDITIONS OF RELEASE.
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